Immediately following the signature of the Convention, the Government of Burundi shall submit to the United Nations a request for an international peacekeeping force, in accordance with the purposes referred to in article 27, paragraph 5, of Protocol III to the Agreement. Account should be taken of the practice of the United Nations in this area. This force is notably responsible for:  The UN report on Rwanda, quoted in Nancy Soderberg`s book The Superpower Myth, stated that "the UN mission is based on the success of the peace process. The general failure to create a force with the capacity, resources and mandate to deal with the violence and genocide that could develop in Rwanda had its roots in mission planning. Soderberg, Nancy. The SuperPower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might, New York: Wiley, 2005, p. 287. Not all the main parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During these three years of pause, the implementation of civil administration reforms began. The agreement called for reforms to depoliticize the civil service, reduce corruption and increase skills. In 2001, the Government conducted a census of civil servants throughout the country. The result published in February 2002 employed 40,642 people in the civil service, but the Ministry of The Civil Service had sent paychecks to 41,642 people.
About 1,000 people who had been paid were not taken into account.1 In July 2002, Parliament passed a new law allowing trade unions for civil servants.2 No initiative was taken to achieve a balance between ethnic groups in the civil service. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, widely known as the Arusha Accords, was a transitional peace treaty that ended Burundi`s civil war. The agreement, negotiated in Arusha, Tanzania, through former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, was signed on 28 August 2000.  Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said that "although the Rwandan government is sensitive to the proposals of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank, the Bank`s general staff has stated that it faces many restrictions and will soon have to make decisive decisions. He also writes: "The Bank is also supporting a roundtable on Rwanda, held by UNDP, to assess humanitarian needs (including demobilization), but only after there is a comprehensive macroeconomic agreement and ways are found to support it. She writes that "it is a moral obligation for the United Nations to contribute, upon request, to peaceful solutions to conflicts. This is a case where both sides do seem to be showing their willingness to lay down their arms and, unlike other areas (e.g. Angola, Bosnia, Georgia) where the benevolence of the protagonists is questionable.
Abandoning this cry for help could have tragic human consequences. Not all the main parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During these three years of difference, the implementation of the power-sharing provision began. After the Arusha agreement, all parties agreed to lead Pierre Buyoya of the Union of the National Progress Party (UPRONA) for the first 18 months of the transition period with Domitien Ndayizeye of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) as vice-president. . . .